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Introduction
Much of the scholarship on democracy was produced in a global context characterized
by Cold War ideologies. In this context, democracy often came to be associated with
capitalist societies that embody, first and foremost, principles of freedom, competition
and self-determination. Equality, in contrast, was more frequently associated with the
underlying principles of socialist or communist societies, many of which were ruled
autocratically by single parties or absolutist dictators. It is not surprising, then, that
the most widely-accepted conceptions of democracy tend to emphasize freedom, com-
petition and participation, and sometimes distinctively liberal aspects such as private
property rights, constraints on executive power, and strong, independent judiciaries,
much more than they do equality.
Despite this historical association, equality occupies an important place in much of
democratic theory. As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, ”democracy and socialism have
nothing in common but one word, equality.”1 Indeed, much of the earliest theorizing
about democracy was based on the simple idea that individuals are not inherently un-
equal, as aristocratic systems implied. More recent scholarship has addressed a wide
range of ways in which not only political equality but also (at least some minimum
levels of) socio-economic equality in terms of, for example, conditions of health, edu-
cation and income protection. It is increasingly evident that these factors are integral t
both the persistence and quality of democratic polities.
V-Dem’s conception of egalitarian democracy builds on the theorized notion that
individuals from all social groups ought to be equally capable of exercising their
political rights and freedoms, and of influencing political and governing processes.
Underlying this broad principle are two main sub-components: equal protection and
equal distribution of resources. Equal protection implies that the state grants and protects
rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. An equal distribution of resources
ensures that individuals have the basic necessities enabling them to exercise those
rights and freedoms, and leading towards an equal potential to influence decision
making.
This paper begins by discussing the theoretical foundations of egalitarian democ-
racy, then describes the V-Dem approach to creating an index of egalitarian democracy
1See Mayer et al. (1960).
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including a discussion of both the data and methods used to create the index. Using a
variety of techniques, we then test the validity of V-Dem’s measures of the Egalitarian
component of democracy as well as its constituent parts. The paper concludes by
outlining potential directions for research on egalitarian democracy, and its potential
contribution to our broader understanding of democracy.
The Concept of Egalitarian Democracy
Egalitarian conceptions of democracy rest on the foundation that democracy, as a
systemof rule “by thepeople,” requires that citizens are equally capable of participating
in the governing process. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de jure and de facto
capabilities to participate in a variety of ways. These forms of participation include,
but are not limited to, making informed voting decisions, expressing one’s opinion,
demonstrating, running for o ce, serving in positions of political power, putting
issues on the agenda, and otherwise influencing policy-making. Thus, the concept of
egalitariandemocracy implies thatmaterial and immaterial inequalities fundamentally
inhibit the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence amore equal distribution
of resources across various groups should enhance political equality.
The importance of egalitarianism arises, in part, out of the need to distinguish
democratic forms of government from aristocratic or autocratic ones. As Bernstein
(1961) wrote, democracy represents “an absence of class government, as the indication
of a social condition where a political privilege belongs to no one class as opposed to
the whole community”(1961: 21). This negative definition of democracy is integral to
much theorizing about democracy, both about its origins and e↵ectiveness as a form
of government. For example, in his landmark study of democratization, Dahl notes
that hegemonic political regimes are considerably more common where a small group
of elites monopolizes the political and economic resources in society (Dahl, 1989: 85-
86). Likewise, warnings about the potential for tyrannical majorities to undermine
democratic forms of government relate directly to the notion of a privileged political
class (Madison, 1787; Mill, 1859).
As these perspectives imply, the importance of equality in a democratic polity is
fundamentally related to participation. The systematic deprivation or inequality of
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rights and/or resources limits the extent to which individuals or particular groups may
participate in, and exercise influence over, political and governing processes.2 The
Athenian notion that “no political system could be legitimate, desirable or good if it
excluded the people from participating in ruling”(Dahl, 1989: 25) reflects the multidi-
mensional nature of this relationship. Equal participation not only lends legitimacy to
the democratic system, but also renders it a more e↵ective instrument of rule.
Regarding legitimacy, equality minimizes the “resentments and frustrations” of
some groups in society (Robert, 1971: 82), thereby leading to greater overall acceptance
of the system in place. As Lipset (1959) notes, if some groups are denied access to
political and governing processes, especially in newer democracies, the legitimacy of
the system is likely to remain in question (1959: 89). In a study using survey data
across countries, Anderson and Barimendi find empirical support for the idea that
the decision to participate in the political system is itself an expression of legitimacy
for that system (Anderson and Barimendi, 2008: 290). In other words, equal levels, or
opportunities for, participationmay quell the potentialmobilization of anti-democratic
forces, thereby increasing the chances of democratic survival and stability.3
Equality, some argue, can also make the democratic polity more e↵ective.4 In that
equality amonggroupsproduces lower levels of polarization, an egalitariandemocracy
can more e↵ectively resolve political and policy disputes. In Democracy and Education,
for instance, Dewey explains democracy as “a society which makes provision for
participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible
readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the di↵erent forms of associated
life”(1916: 99). It is through these interactions that governments come to better serve
their citizens.
E↵ectiveness and legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing in such a way that further
2This implies that egalitarian democracy is likely to be closely related to the principle of participatory
democracy, one of V-Dem’s other principles. But seeing as the focus in V-Dem’s participatory doctrine
is on availability of institutional mechanisms for direct participation and actual exercise of participatory
actions such as voting, the egalitarian principle is necessary to elaborate the preconditions such as state-
guarantees of rights across groups and provision of socio-economic equality that make participation
possible.
3As (Robert, 1971: 89-91) argues, however, democratic regimes can, in many cases, tolerate high
levels of inequality by granting only small political concessions to marginalized populations.
4In defining e↵ectiveness, we follow the definition provided by Lipset: “the extent to which it
satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society”
(1959: 86). We recognize that there may be many ways in which a democratic regime is more or less
e↵ective, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate and adjudicate the many approaches to
this concept.
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strengthens democracy. This type of dynamic comes about, asDahl (1989) explains, not
onlywhen de jure forms of equality exist, but when citizens truly “believe that no single
member, and no minority of members, is so definitely better qualified to rule that the
one or the few should be permitted to rule over the entire association. They believe, on
the contrary, that all members of the association are adequately qualified to participate
on an equal footing with the others in the process of governing the association(Dahl,
1989: 31). This “strong principle of equality,” Dahl argues, ensures that “when binding
decisions are made, no citizen’s claims as to the laws, rules and policies to be adopted
are to be counted as superior to the claims of any other citizen” (1989: 105), thereby
lending both legitimacy and a sense of e↵ectiveness to the democratic process.
As Dahl (1989) makes clear, prospects for equality and equal participation in a
democracy are also closely related to questions about the definition and composition
of the ‘demos’. With respect to Athenian democracy, Aristotle famously argued that
democracy is only possible in smaller, homogeneous polities. In particular, only in
contexts where “few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation
in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop
the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible dema-
gogues” (Lipset, 1981: 31). Dahl (1989) echoes this concern, noting that large levels of
inequality are likely to undermine the strong principle of equality, since the wealthy
will be likely to see the poor as unfit to rule.
The relationship between economic and political inequalities is of particular im-
portance to the prospects for achieving the ‘strong principle.’ Where inequalities exist
along socioeconomic lines, Walzer argues that one way to advance the ”strong prin-
ciple” is to redistribute in such a way that “redraws the line between politics and
economics” resulting in a strengthened “sphere of politics” (Walzer, 1983: 122). For
Walzer, the key to achieving greater equality in society is by ensuring what he calls
“complex equality,” or the idea that inequality does not overlap across political and
economic spheres. As we explain below, where the state ensures ample protection of
rights and freedoms to all groups and distributes resources in a way that su ciently
Given that the exclusion of citizens from democratic processes undermines the po-
tential for a legitimate and e↵ective government that is responsive to all citizens, the
principle of egalitarian democracymust address the ways in which equal participation
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becomes both possible and productive. First, the denial of universal su↵rage, outlaw-
ing of some political parties, or other de jure conditions can fundamentally impede the
ability of some groups to meaningfully participate. These conditions have occurred
quite frequently in the history of democracies, such as in the denial of voting rights
to slaves, women and other marginalized populations.5 Exclusion can also be indirect
or informal such as when su↵rage is legally universal but some groups in society are
denied the protections and resources necessary to participate. There are abundant ex-
amples of these types of informal limitations, such as intimidation of particular groups
voters, unequal access to justice, a dearth of resources that make participation possi-
ble, such as time, money, health or education. Whether formal or informal, potentially
harms both the e↵ectiveness and legitimacy of the democratic system.
The mediating e↵ect of participation in the relationship between inequality and
democracy guides our conceptualization of V-Dem’s Egalitarian principle.6 Viewed
as an inhibitor of meaningful participation in both political and governing processes,
inequality can threaten the electoral, participatory and deliberative elements of democ-
racy. Our elaboration of the concept of egalitarian democracy therefore focuses prin-
cipally on the ways that equality enables more meaningful participation of both in-
dividuals and social groups. We focus in particular on two broad sub-components
that relate closely to the potential for equal participation - and hence, influence - in
governing processes. First, the government must protect the rights and freedoms of in-
dividuals equally across all groups. Second, egalitarian democracy requires the state to
invest in, or otherwise facilitate, an equal distribution of resources. Together these two
subcomponents form the basis for V-Dem’s Egalitarian component of democracy. 7
5For a slightly di↵erent perspective on the inability of certain groups to participate, see Cohen’s
(2009) conception of “semi-citizenship.”
6To elaborate various principles of democracy, V-Dem uses both components and high-level indices or
HLI’s. As described in Section 3, V-Dem produces the Egalitarian Component, an index that aggregate
the fundamental concepts associatedwith the principle (called subcomponents), aswell as an Egalitarian
Democracy Index that combines the principle with the concept of electoral democracy. The terms
“principle” and “component” are used interchangeably.
7Note that egalitarian democracy as we define it does not entail equality of power between leaders
and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful and because, at any given time,
power is likely to be skewed in favor of one group or another. The idea, more broadly, is that groups or
individuals are equally capable of holding power and exerting influence over the governing process.
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Equal Protection
Equality, as Rousseau declared, is necessary because “liberty cannot subsist without
it” (Rousseau, 1920: 170). For V-Dem, the Equal Protection subcomponent means that
the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups, such
that all citizens are free to engage in the political process. The egalitarian principle
implies that state guarantees the rights and freedoms comprising V-Dem’s liberal and
participatory components equally to all citizens.8 Whereas the liberal principle focuses
largely on the extent to which formal political rights and civil liberties are codified in a
country’s constitution, the Equal Protection subcomponent focuses to a larger extent on
the e↵ective extension of those rights and freedoms across the populace. In this sense,
the subcomponent considers not only the formal extension of rights and liberties, but
also their e↵ective extension across groups and territories.
Stating that “that all adultmembers of thepolitical community shouldhave an equal
right to have their voices heard, and be given equal consideration in the formulation
of public policy,” (Beetham, 1999: 282) argues that equal protection of human rights is
integral to democracy. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state
itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate. It must also take action
to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions
of another group or individual. The equal protection of rights requires not only that
formal protections, but that the various instruments of the state not interfere in the
ability of some citizens to exercise these rights.
There are myriad ways that rights and freedoms could be unequally applied across
social groups. Historically, political or civil rights have often been extended only to
certain social groups such as non-slaves, property owners, men, religious groups, and
so on. It is not uncommon that some groups are barred from contesting political o ce,
forming political parties or freely expressing their views. Additionally, subtle intim-
idation by government o cials, such as placing law enforcement o cers at polling
stations, can deter marginalized or minority communities from participating. Di -
culties registering to vote, or accessing justice in the case of rights violations, can also
deter members of certain groups from participating.
8Note that this could also apply to contexts where the definition of citizenship is severely restricted
thereby excluding large groups of people from enjoying an array of rights and freedoms.
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Equal Distribution
In addition to protecting the rights and freedoms of groups equally, literature on egali-
tarian democracy suggests that inequalities of health, education, income or other basic
needs inhibit the exercise of political power and the enjoyment of political rights.
Hence, a more equal distribution of these resources across social groups is necessary
to achieve political equality.9 V-Dem’s second subcomponent of the Egalitarian com-
ponent thus measures the extent to which resources are distributed equally in society.
An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two principal
ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services (such as
food, water, housing, education and healthcare) ensure that all individuals are capable
of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order
for individuals to be able to e↵ectively exercise their rights and freedoms (see, for
example, Beetham (1999); Saward (1998); Sen (2001).
The idea that basic resources are necessary to ensure citizens’ abilities to participate
can be traced back to Athenian democracy where, as Walzer describes, “the citizens
as a body were prepared to lay out large sums” in order to “make it possible for each
and every citizen to participate in political life”(Walzer, 1983: 71). The provision of
basic services such as health and education are also critical to enabling all groups to
meaningfully participate in political and governing processes. Following the logic of
Maslow (1943) and Sen (2001), if citizens need to spend their time and energy concerned
about sickness, security or other basic needs, they are considerably less likely to engage
in activities related to self-actualization or the governance of their communities. A
particularly cogent case concerns equal access to healthcare, for example. If citizens
are denied healthcare in away that leads to sickness or even death, they cannot exercise
the right to vote. In short, where groups or individuals are deprived of these resources,
their de facto abilities to participate can be severely impaired.
Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer popu-
lations to participate meaningfully (Sinclair, 1962; Dahl, 2006). To this end, social or
economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most
notably by Walzer (1983), who argues that overlapping “spheres” of inequality are
9See, for example, Berman (2006); Bernstein (1961); Dahl (1982, 1989); Dewey (1916); Dworkin (1987);
Gould (1988); Miller and Walzer (1995).
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particularly harmful to society.
Following, again, the healthcare example: if one group has a significantly shorter
life expectancy than another because of lack of access to healthcare, their political
influence will consequently be reduced over time. A similar argument is typically
made regarding education. Individuals and groups with higher levels of education
are more likely to comprehend and engage in political debates (Verba et al., 1995). a
condition that is necessary for one to make informed choices; to stand for o ce, to
be active in political parties, and so on. Lack of high-quality basic education impairs
an individual’s abilities to be a political equal. It is for this reason that Dahl suggests
that “each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering
and validating...the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve their
interest”(Dahl, 1989: 112). Where opportunities or abilities to participate are limited,
it is neither possible for citizens to adequately understand and formulate opinions on
particular issues, nor is it likely that their interests, once formed, will be adequately
represented in decision processes.
Sen (2001) provides yet another perspective on the way that resource inequality
can harm individuals’ abilities to participate meaningfully in social and political life.
As he explains, “relative deprivation in terms of incomes can yield absolute deprivation
in terms of capabilities...In a generally opulent country, more income is needed to buy
enough commodities to achieve the same social functioning” ”taking part in the life of
the community” (Sen, 2001: 89). Thus, Sen not only warns against the potential for
overlapping spheres of inequality, but suggests that these particular inequalities are
not likely to abate as countries grow or transform their economies.
The need for democracies to distribute resources equally is, perhaps, best summed
up by Dahl:
In the democratic vision, the freedom achieved by a democratic order is
above all the freedom of self determination in making collective and bind-
ing decisions: the self-determination of citizens entitled to participate as
political equals in making the laws and rules under which they will live
together as citizens...it follows that a democratic society would, among
other things, manage to allocate its resources so as to optimize political
equality, and thus the primary freedom of collective self-determination by
means of the democratic process, as well as the liberties necessary to that
process.(Dahl, 1989: 326)
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In other words, if the goal of a system characterized by ‘rule by the people’ is to realize
a collective self-determination, then an equal distribution of resources is necessary to
meaningfully advance that goal.
Data and Measurement
TheV-Demdataset includes some 350 indicators covering 173 countries over the period
1900 to the present. The underlying data for about half of these indicators are obtained
from over 2,700 country experts from across the world. Multiple, independent experts
code each country-year for every indicator. For the purposes of the indices discussed
here, we use only expert-based indicators measuring de facto constraints on the actual
use of political rights stemming from the lack of state protection and/or the lack of
socio-economic equality. A comprehensive account of the data collection process and
the Baysian ordinal IRT-modeling employed to produce point estimates and confidence
levels for the indicators is found in the ”V-Dem Methodology” document (Coppedge
et al., 2015b), and in the description of the measurement model by Pemstein et al.
(2015). Both papers are available at https://v-dem.net.10
Several goals guide the selection of indicators and construction of these indices.
First, the Egalitarian component is designed to be orthogonal to V-Dem’s other democ-
racy indices. This means that we only select indicators that are not employed in the
other indices. Second, we strive to construct each subcomponent in away that captures
the two theoretical dimensions of the egalitarian component indentified above, in a
coherent and conceptually distinct fashion. Starting from a conceptual logic identify-
ing which of the individual indicators should tap into each of the two subcomponents,
we then employed a basic principal components analysis to confirm that these sets of
indicators load onto a single underlying dimension. This preliminary analysis of the
indicators thus helps to ensure that the subcomponents reflect coherent concepts that
can be distinguished from other concepts of interest. In the final step, Bayesian Factors
Analysis is used to aggregate individual indicators to estimates of its single underly-
ing dimension. One distinct advantage of these data is that they include confidence
10Future versions of the egalitarian indices will include indicators that are not based on V-Dem expert
surveys. These indicators will supplement the V-Dem data available to produce “thick” versions of the
egalitarian component and subcomponents.
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Table 1: Indicators used in the Equal Protection Subcomponent
Indicator Code Mean SD N
Equal access to justice v2xcl acjst .061 1.481 16,526
Social class equality in respect for civil liberties v2clacjust -.052 1.497 15,105
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties v2clsocgrp .075 1.47 16,526
Weaker civil liberties (percent of population) v2clnlpct 42.756 20.894 15,151
intervals for each estimate, taking rater accountability and uncertainty into account.
This is the same procedure used for all V-Dem subcomponents and is also discussed
in Pemstein et al. (2015)
The Equal Protection and Equal Distribution Subcomponent Indices
We develop the Equal Protection subcomponent utilizing V-Dem measures reflecting,
in general, the extent to which rights and freedoms are applied equally across the
population. The specific measures, listed in Table 1, are measuring respect for civil
liberties across social classes, social groups and across the territory as well as the extent
to which citizens have equal access to justice.11
The Equal Distribution of Resources subcomponent employs seven V-Dem indica-
tors capturing the extent to which basic resources are provided by the government and
the extent to which these resources are distributed equally among the population. We
include not only measures of the distribution of public goods and services but also the
distribution of power across social groups. The indicators used to construct the Equal
Distribution of Resources subcomponent are listed in Table 2
The Egalitarian Component Index
V-Dem’sEgalitarian Component (v2x egal) aggregates theEqual Protection andEqual Dis-
tribution subcomponent indices. TheEgalitarianComponent index is formedby simply
averaging the Equal Protection and Equal Distribution of Resources subcomponents.
Like the other V-Dem indices for liberal, participatory, and deliberative components,
this approach represents a compromise, or default, when there is no clear theoretical
11While the V-Dem dataset does provide other indicators that would serve as good measures of con-
cepts related to equal protection, those indicators are not included in the Equal Protection subcomponent
because they are employed in one of the other democracy indices.
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Table 2: Indicators used in the Equal Distribution of Resources subcomponent
Indicator Code Mean SD N
Particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps .016 1.478 16,517
Means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl -.223 1.474 16,517
Educational equality v2peedueq -.346 1.609 16,545
Health equality v2pehealth -.239 1.595 16,545
Power distributed by socioeconomic position v2pepwrses -.391 1.434 16,545
Power distributed by social group v2pepwrsoc -.174 1.504 16,546
Power distributed by gender v2pepwrgen -.795 1.303 16,546
guidance on the relationship between the subcomponents. As described in Coppedge
et al. (2015a), if the two subcomponents were both necessary for the concept to exist,
then a multiplicative approach to aggregation would be most appropriate. If they are
best aggregated such that one subcomponent could substitute for the other, then an
additive approach should be used. Given that both the equal protection of rights and
the equal distribution of resources are necessary to have egalitarian democracy and that
strength on one component may represent a higher achievement of egalitarianism, we
take the mean of the two subcomponents - a strategy that recognizes the relevance of
both approaches to this particular concept. In short, by averaging the two subcom-
ponents together, we acknowledge that countries scoring high on one dimension but
lower on the other should still be considered as more closely embodying the principle
of egalitarianism. Averaging also acknowledges that if a country denies its citizens
either the equal protection of rights or the equal distribution of resources, then they are
e↵ectively limiting the extent to which they embody the egalitarian principle. Finally,
this aggregation puts a premium on countries that are strong in both dimensions.
Consider a hypothetical country case. A communist country, for example, may
score highly on the Equal Distribution subcomponent but very low on the Equal Pro-
tection subcomponent, since the latter measures the application of rights and freedoms
across the social groups and territory. While the equal distribution of resources in this
country implies that citizens are likely to be very capable of participating should rights
and freedoms be granted to them, the fact that the application of rights and freedoms
is limited e↵ectively nullifies their ability to participate. While the fact that citizens
across social groups are capable of participating reflects a stronger potential for egal-
itarian democracy, the lacking protection of rights and freedoms e↵ectively renders
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this capability moot. This country would, at maximum, get a medium score on the
Egalitarian component. One must remember that no claim is made that this is a mea-
sure of democracy, only the extent to which egalitarian principles are incorporated in
the polity. It is at the next level of aggregation that Egalitarian Democracy is measured,
where lack of electoral aspects in this type of country case, would further minimize
the impact of having a relatively high score on just one of the subcomponents.
The Egalitarian Democracy Index
Following the aggregation rule of V-Dem’s other democracy indices, the egalitarian
component is then combined with the Electoral Democracy index (v2x polyarchy)
to form the Egalitarian Democracy index (v2x egaldem). In the V-Dem conceptual
scheme, the electoral principle is regarded as of critical importance for all other con-
ceptions of democracy. There can be no democracy without elections, but following
the canon in each of the traditions that argues that electoral democracy is insu cient,
there is more to democracy than just elections. We therefore combine the score for the
Electoral Democracy index with the score for the Egalitarian Component. Based on
extensive deliberations among the authors and other members of the V-Dem research
group, the following aggregation formula is used:
v2x egaldem = .25 ⇤ v2x polyarchy1.6 + .25 ⇤ v2x egal + .5 ⇤ v2x polyarchy1.6 ⇤ v2x egal
Theunderlying rationale is equalweightingof the additive terms and themultiplicative
term in order to respect both the Sartorian necessary condition logic and a family
resemblance logic. The degree of egalitarianess still matter for egalitarian democracy
even when there is no electoral democracy, and electoral democracy still matters even
when there is no egalitarianism; but the highest level of egalitarian democracy can be
attained only when there is a high-level of both electoral democracy and egalitarianess
(for further details including the detailed rationale for weights, see Coppedge et al.
2015a. ”Comparisons and Contrast”, V-Dem project document).
Descriptive statistics for the subcomponent, component and high-level indices are
provided in Table 3. All indices are scaled between 0-1. Due to the varying aggregation
techniques, the scores on the Egalitarian Democracy index are considerably lower than
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Table 3: Egalitarian Indices Descriptive Statistics
Indicator Code Mean SD N
Equal Protection Subcomponent v2xeg eqprotec .453 .296 14288
Equal Distribution Subcomponent v2xeg eqdist .411 .308 16,522
Egalitarian Component v2x egal .439 .273 16,522
Egalitarian Democracy Index v2x egaldem .250 .244 15,828
the other three indices. It is also important to note that because the Equal Protection
and Egalitarian Component indices utilize the continuous measure of the percent of
the population to which civil rights and liberties apply, the overall scores may not be
completely comparable to other V-Dem indices that do not make use of continuous
variables.
Validation of the Indices
Towhat extent does V-Dem’s Egalitarian component capture the concepts as described
above? This sections employs a variety of validation tests designed to evaluate V-
Dem’s measure of egalitarian democracy. Since few, if any, measures of egalitarian
democracy exist, testing the validity of the V-Dem’s Egalitarian Component index
is not necessarily a straightforward matter. To the extent possible, we follow the
guidance of Adcock and Collier (2001), Seawright and Collier (2014) and Gerring
(2011) by conducting validation tests using content, case and convergent/discriminant
methods, each of which “provides one kind of evidence to be integrated into an overall
process of assessment”(Adcock and Collier, 2001: 543).12
The purpose of the validity tests in this section is to assess the extent to which
the index captures the concepts described in the previous section. Our approach to
validation specifically addresses the possibility of systematic measurement error that
compromises the extent to which the index measures the concepts of interest. System-
atic measurement error introduces bias into the concept therebyweakening confidence
12This paper does not yet include a fourth type of test - nomological validation. This type of validation
utilizes tests of theorized relationships involving the systematized concept of interest. Confirmation
of the theorized relationship in this case is treated as evidence for the measure’s validity (Adcock and
Collier, 2001: 542).
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not only in the index itself but in the theorized relationships (Gerring, 2011: 159).13 Ad-
ditionally, the validity tests focus principally on the egalitarian component and its two
subcomponents, rather than on the validity of the specific indicators used to construct
the subcomponents, or on the broader Egalitarian Democracy index, which combines
the Egalitarian component with the Electoral (or Polyarchy) index.
Content Validation
Content validation addresses the question of whether or not the measure adequately
captures the full content of the systematized concept. It assesses whether or not the
appropriate conceptual elements are included as well as the extent to which inappro-
priate elements are not included (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 538). It can be especially
important to assess the content validity of measures produced using a latent variable
approach given the uncertainty involved in assuming the existence of an underlying
latent variable within a set of observed indicators.
As Bollen and Jackman (1989) argues, in order to assess content validity, there must
be some level of agreement about the concepts being investigated. Drawing on the
conceptual discussion above, we assess the extent to which the content of the indices
capture the concepts of interest, or at least the indicators associated with those con-
cepts. First, to assess the extent to which we have captured a coherent set of concept,
we investigate the correlations amongst the four indices. As seen in Table 4, there is
are, unsurprisingly, correlations greater than .85 between the Egalitarian Democracy,
Egalitarian Component, as well as the two subcomponents. More reassuring, how-
ever, is the strong correlation between the two subcomponents (.833), suggesting an
underlying relationship between equal protection and equal distribution that form the
basis of the egalitarian principle of democracy.14
Table 5 shows correlations of constituent indicators with the four indices. Looking first
13Note that we focus exclusively on validity in this paper, rather than on reliability. The notion
of reliability relates to random (stochastic) error. Given that V-Dem’s processes of data generation
are specifically designed to minimize random error, and that their indicators include confidence in-
tervals with the explicit purpose of measuring random error, we refer readers interested in the reli-
ability of the data used to construct the index to V-Dem’s reference materials, available at https://v-
dem.net/en/reference/version-4-mar-2015/.
14In future versions of this paper we plan to also analyze the posterior loadings matrix resulting
from the Bayesian Factor Analysis to get a better sense of which variables are ‘doing the most work’ to
produce the model’s estimates for each index.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Four Indices*
Index Code Egal Dem Egal Comp Eq. Protec. Eq. Dist.
Egalitarian Democracy v2x egaldem 1.000
Egalitarian Component v2x egal 0.891 1.000
Equal Protection v2xeg eqprotec 0.850 0.953 1.000
Equal Distribution v2xeg eqdr 0.854 0.961 0.833 1.000
*All correlation coe cients statistically significant at 99% confidence level
at the Egalitarian Component index, the indicators correlating the most strongly are
equal access to justice across socio-economicgroups, health equality, education equality
and civil liberties applied across social groups. These strong relationships suggest that
concepts related to both equal protection and equal distribution of resources are well-
represented in the component. The fact that the distribution of health and education
resources relate closely to the resulting component fitwellwith the theorized relevance,
described in greater detail above, of access to quality health and education resources
to participatory equality.
It is also encouraging that the indicators used in the Equal protection index correlate
relatively strongly with the Equal Distribution subcomponent and vice versa. With
the exception of universalistic welfare policies and power distribution by gender,
the indicators used in the Equal Distribution subcomponent correlate at .7 or above
with the Equal Protection subcomponent. These correlations are consistent with our
expectation that an equal distribution of resources to lead to greater levels of equality
in participation, which in turn would lead to rights and freedoms extended to greater
proportions of the population.
Finally, the relatively weak association of the four indices to the indicator measuring
the percent of the population for whom civil liberties are protected (v2clsnlpct) is not
surprising given that the continuous nature of this particular variable produces greater
levels of variation in indicator scores. We therefore view the relativelyweak correlation
coe cients as a statistical anomaly rather than a sign that the equal application of civil
liberties is only weakly associated with our indices.
Overall, the strong correlations among the indicators and indices provide confi-
dence in the content of the indices. The correlations across the Equal Protection and
Equal Distribution subcomponents are especially encouraging, since these associations
15
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point to the presence of mutually-reinforcing dynamics between these two important
egalitarian concepts in such a way that reinforces the broader phenomenon of the
egalitarian principle of democracy.
Case Validity
As a second validation check, we examine the extent to which the indices match our
knowledge of particular cases both across units (countries) and over time. First, we
examine countries scoring highest, lowest, and at themedian on each of the four indices
in di↵erent time periods. Table 6 shows examples of these country rankings.
As seen in Table 6, a set of countries consisting of the Scandinavian countries, Switzer-
land and Slovenia consistently score highest on all indices across the three time periods.
Second, at the lowest end of the spectrum of index scores we find countries that we
tend to consider both oppressive and weak in terms of their capacity to deliver goods
and services to their populations. Countries like Angola, Somalia, Myanmar, Guinea-
Bissau and South Sudan make multiple appearances as the lowest-scoring countries
across the four indices. In the median category we see a wide variety of countries
ranging from authoritarian socialist regimes such as Cuba to relatively capitalist and
democratic ones such as South Korea.
Another way to evaluate the face validity is to plot the equal distribution versus
equal protection subcomponents. Figure 1 shows such a plot for the mean scores
over the period of 1990-2015. The scatter plot shows a strong positive correlation
between the two dimensions. In general, countries that we would expect to score
high on both dimensions are found in the upper right-hand corner, such as the Nordic
countries and post-Communist democracies such as Poland, the Czech Republic and
others. Countries like Cuba, China and Thailand demonstrate relatively high equal
distribution scores for their levels of Equal Protection, while those countries with
relatively liberal regimes but weaker distributions of resources - Benin and Senegal for
example - appear further below the best-fit line.
We also examine whether or not the variables change over time as expected. Focusing
on major events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the US civil rights movement
or the gradualistic economic reforms in China, we can assess the extent to which our
indices capture the expected movements resulting from these types of events.
17
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Figure 1: Scatter Plot: Equal Protection vs. Equal Distribution in 2010
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Equal Protection
An examination of Russia and Poland following the events of the late 1980s and
early 1990s provides both cross-country and cross-temporal assessments of the Equal
Distribution subcomponent. Given the varying results of economic reform in Poland
and Russia, specifically related to the distribution of state assets, we would expect to
see Russia’s scores on Equal Distribution declinemore rapidly than Poland’s following
the transitions. Likewise, we would expect the onset of communist rule in Russia in
1917 and in Poland after World War II to produce a distinct upward trend in the
Equal Distribution subcomponent. Overall, the Egalitarian component may not show
very strong fluctuation, since the Equal Protection component would likely be moving
in opposite directions. Figure 2 shows that the Equal Distribution component indeed
captures the expected fluctuations across the two countries. Specifically, Russia’s Equal
Distribution subcomponent rises considerably around the time of the 1917 revolution
then drops precipitously after 1991. Poland’s sharp rise in the Equal Distribution score
occurs both around 1917 and again after World War II, when Soviet occupation began.
It does not show any signs of decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a
pattern that reflects a more successful process of economic reform that both delayed
privatization and ensured social welfare mechanisms (Sachs et al., 1995).
A more gradual process of economic liberalization in China is also evident from the
19
Figure 2: Equal Distribution Subcomponent in Russia and Poland
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Equal Distribution subcomponent. As seen in Figure 3, while Equal Distribution
rose considerably after Mao’s rise to power in 1949 it began a period of increasing
fluctuation and slight decline as Chinese leaders since Deng Xaoping have pursued
economic reform since Mao’s death in 1976. In other words, whereas the Cultural
Revolution evened the distribution of resources, liberalization reforms since the 1970s
have led to a consistent downward trend in the Equal Distribution subcomponent in
China.
A closer examination of the Equal Protection subcomponent also demonstrates its
ability to measure changes over time in the equal protection of rights. Figure 4, for
example, shows changes in the Equal Protection subcomponent over time in theUnited
States. As expected a major increase occurs in Equal Protection scores around the time
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A small increase is also evident around the time that
women were granted su↵rage in 1919, but the small size of this increase is probably
due to our inability to include indicators of the equal application of civil rights across
gender because such indicators are employed in other indices.
The time trends in the Equal Distribution subcomponent in the U.S. are also telling.
Distribution rises following the passage of the New Deal and again in the 1960s, but
levels o↵ as retrenchment of these major social programs became more prevalent in
20
Figure 3: Equal Distribution Subcomponent in China
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the 1970s and 80s. The Egalitarian Component, represented by the solid line, follows a
somewhat consistentmiddle ground between the two subcomponents, but tracksmore
closely to Equal Distribution in more recent decades. Why, exactly, the component
tracks more closely to Equal Distribution requires further inquiry.
Finally, we present time trends across the four indices in Rwanda in Figure 5.
Sharp increases in both subcomponents are evident around Rwanda’s independence
from the Belgians in 1962. With the onset of civil war in 1994 Equal Protection falls
dramatically. Since the end of the war and Rwanda’s subsequent economic successes,
Equal Distribution rises steadily, while the gains in Equal Protection under President
Kagame are less strong. While the Egalitarian Component tracks, as expected, between
the two subcomponents, the recent increases in the Egalitarian Democracy index are
somewhat less sharp, reflecting the continued absence of a strong electoral democracy.
Overall, the cases demonstrate the potential utility of the four indices in capturing
relevant variation - both across countries and over time - in various aspects of egal-
itarian conceptions of democracy. Though the case of the United States shows that
the Equal Protection index may not always capture all relevant discrepancies in the
extension of rights and freedoms, the overall movements in the four indices across a
variety of cases merit a su ciently high level of confidence that the index scores, in
21
Figure 4: Equal Protection and Distribution in the United States
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general, match what we know about particular cases.
Convergent/Discriminant Validation
The purpose of convergent/discriminant validation is to assess whether or not the
measure relates more closely to alternative indicators of the systematized concept of
interest than it does to measures of di↵erent concepts. If scores of a particular measure
do not converge as expected with alternative indicators, it may be necessary to either
refine the measures to achieve greater convergence or reevaluate the conceptualiza-
tion that led to the expectation of convergence in the first place(Adcock and Collier,
2001: 540). To test convergent/discriminant validity we simply compare and contrast
the indices with other V-Dem indices.15
Table 7 shows correlations of the Egalitarian indiceswith V-Dem’s other component
indices. The correlations show that both the Egalitarian Democracy and Egalitarian
Component Indices correlatewith theDeliberative, Participatory, Civil Society, Gender
and Rule of Law/Individual Liberty indices. They correlate considerably less closely
to the Corruption, Judicial Constraints and Su↵rage indices. Generally speaking,
these patterns of correlation are consistent with the theoretical expectations outlined
in the conceptual discussion above. Specifically, we expect the egalitarian measures to
relate most closely to measures of the participatory, deliberative and liberal principles.
Moreover, the relativelyweak correlation of the EgalitarianDemocracy and Egalitarian
Component indices with less relevant concepts provides further confidence that the
measure discriminates between ‘egalitariannism’ and other, distinct concepts.
Moving on to examine the correlations between the subcomponent indices and
other V-Dem indices, we see that while both the Equal Protection and Equal Distri-
bution indices correlate very strongly with the Gender Empowerment index, Equal
Protection also corresponds very closely to the Civil Liberties and the Equality Before
the Law/Individual Liberties indices, while the Equal Distribution subcomponent re-
lates more closely to the Core Civil Society index. These varying correlations, though
slight, make sense considering the conceptual background of the two subcomponents.
In particular, assuming that basic rights to participation exist the core civil society
15In future versions of this paper, we plan to further convergent/discriminant validation by also
comparing and contrasting the egalitarian indices with variables related to egalitarian principles from
outside the V-Dem dataset
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Table 7: Correlations with Other V-Dem Indices
Index Code Eg. Dem. Eg. Comp. Eq. Prot. Eq. Dist.
Polyarchy v2x polyarchy 0.949 0.788 0.753 0.755
Participatory v2x partip 0.829 0.727 0.701 0.685
Liberal v2x liberal 0.811 0.720 0.737 0.641
Deliberative v2x delibdem 0.961 0.782 0.745 0.745
Corruption v2x corr -0.454 -0.417 -0.390 -0.390
Core Civil Society v2x gencs 0.787 0.781 0.705 0.778
Civil Society Particip. v2x cspart 0.828 0.729 0.717 0.671
Free Expression v2x freexp 0.767 0.619 0.644 0.541
Civil Liberties v2x gencl 0.816 0.812 0.821 0.733
Gender v2x gender 0.839 0.848 0.775 0.832
Judicial Const. on Exec. v2x jucon 0.674 0.580 0.587 0.518
Rule of Law and Ind. Lib. v2x rol free 0.836 0.752 0.779 0.669
Su↵rage v2x su↵r 0.577 0.638 0.559 0.658
All correlation coe cients statistically significant at 99% confidence level
index - a measure of the “robustness” of civil society - should relate more closely to the
distribution of resources that enable civil society organizations to participate. Like-
wise, de facto su↵rage, as measured by the Su↵rage index, is likely to be more extensive
where resources are distributed equally throughout society.
We draw several important lessons from this series of tests including content, case
and convergent/discriminant methods of validation on the four Egalitarian indices.
First, we are generally confident that the measures as currently constructed capture
the theorized concepts related to egalitarian principles. That said, additionalworkmay
be necessary to build more comprehensive subcomponents, especially to measure the
equal protection of rights and liberties across various types of social groups. Addition-
ally, althoughwe like that the Equal Distribution subcomponent currently captures the
importance of health and educational equality, there is less attention in this subcom-
ponent to income. Integrating income (in)equality measures into ‘thicker’ versions of
the subcomponent will help to capture a wider variety of resource-distribution types.
Second, the close relationship between the Equal Protection and Equal Distribution
subcomponents is encouraging from a conceptual perspective, but has the potential
e↵ect of obscuring important changes in the overall Equal Protection of rights and
24
resources. Conceptually, it makes sense that those with resources can better see to
their protection of rights and freedoms. In this sense, where resources are distributed
more equally amongst the population, we would expect broader protections of rights
and freedoms. But the connection between these two concepts can also obscure the
overall protection of rights. In the case of Rwanda, for example, Figure 5 shows recent
increases in both the protection of rights and the distribution of resources may blur
the widely acknowledged overall reductions in political and civil rights purportedly
resulting from President Kagame’s rule. Future e↵orts to achieve a more fine-grained
distinction between the two subcomponents could help to better understand the un-
derlying dynamics that give rise to, or threaten, egalitarian facets of democracy.
A Research Agenda
We conclude the paper by suggesting a number of ways in which the development of
these four indices related to egalitarian principles of democracy can advance existing
research. Though any research agenda so briefly outlined is undoubtedly incomplete,
we outline three areas that we view as particularly important areas to which V-Dem’s
measure of Egalitarian democracy could contribute. The three areas include global
trends in the egalitarian nature of polities, the relationship between equality/inequality
anddemocratic survival and the relationshipof egalitariandemocracy toDahl’s “strong
principle of equality.”
Figure 6 shows global trends in the four egalitarian indices from 1900-2012.16 The
convergence among the indices following World War II is particularly striking. It
seems likely that some combination of economic prosperity and the spread of com-
munism may have combined to bring the Equal Protection and Equal Distribution
subcomponents closer together. The change in Equal Distribution during this period
is particularly large and would be an interesting area to investigate further to see how
resource distributions changed across di↵erent types of economic systems. Addition-
ally, we see a spurt of growth in all indices corresponding to the “Third Wave” of
democratization at the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. While one might assume
that the fall of communism during this time would lead to less equal distributions of
16The last year for which data are currently available on the full slate of V-Dem countries is 2012.
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Figure 6: Global Trends in Egalitarian Indices
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resources, the Equal Distribution subcomponent appears tomove in close tandemwith
Equal Protection. Amore complete inquiry into these trajectories, and the relationships
between the two subcomponents they imply, would help to deepen our knowledge
about the underlying dynamics of egalitarian democracy.
A second area of potential research relates to the expanding body of empirical re-
search on the relationship between inequality and democracy (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006). Though this area of research has not come to any firm conclu-
sions about the extent towhich inequalitymakes a transition to democracymore or less
likely, there is mounting evidence that high levels of inequality threaten both the sur-
vival and quality of democracy.17 Not only would V-Dem’s egalitarian indices enable
researchers to better grasp the inequality dynamics that shape the probablity of author-
itarian reversals, but they could also provide insight into the particular institutional
mechanisms that a↵ect the participation patterns of the poor or otherwisemarginalized
populations in ways that could potentially undermine democratic stability. The idea
here would be to bring closer together literature on the relationship between inequal-
ity and participation, for example by Gerber (1998); Uslaner and Brown (2005) with
research on the relationship between inequality and democratic survival.
17For example, see Houle (2009); Haggard and Kaufman (2012).
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A final area of research could investigate empirically the origins of Dahl’s “Strong
Principle of Equality.” Dahl (1989) notes specifically that he does not knowwhy strong
beliefs in equality arise in some context but not others. By bringing together mass-
based public opinion survey data with V-Dem’s egalitarian indices, we could better
understand how and why a polity’s egalitarian undercurrents evoke broader beliefs in
equality among citizens.
Ultimately, these three areas of potential research are just a small fractionof the types
of knowledge that could be gained from further advancing our ability to conceptualize
and systematicallymeasure the egalitarian underpinnings of democratic regimes. This
paper points not only to the e↵ectiveness and utility of developing such indices, but
also to the potential benefits from further work to improve these indices and explore
their range of capabilities.
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